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I . INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines technical and to a limited extent,
administrative security controls implemented in the Stock
Point Logistics Integrated Communications Environment
(SPLICE). Not all controls included in SPLICE systems are
discussed; the purpose of this thesis is identification of
those areas where improvements seem warranted. Following a
brief discussion of general security issues, SPLICE, the
Defense Data Network (DDN), and SPLICE security systems will
be reviewed. I will then cover alternative authentication,
encryption, and dial-up port protection techniques from
current literature and conclude with recommendations for
follow on activities.
The information contained in this thesis was gathered
during interviews with personnel at Naval Supply Center
Oakland and a review of the literature referenced. All
references to specific software packages, authentication
devices and encryption/dial-port products are taken from
sources identified without attempts to compare claimed
capabilities and should be taken only as an example of
products available and not the last word in that area.
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II . DEVELOPING SECURITY FOR COMPUTER SYSTEMS
A. SYSTEM EVOLUTION CREATES NEW VULNERABILITIES
As systems develop allowing individual access by a user
to computer resources, the potential for data loss or
compromise increases dramatically. Users are discovering
advantages in real-time response and are creating require-
ments for such applications.
In traditional batch processing environments, user
access to system resources was limited to the few data
processing personnel responsible for loading and operating
the system. These systems were typically centralized and
physically located in one building, often in one room.
Security was often assured only by guarded or locked doors.
As users have gained control of resources the resources have
migrated out of the physically secure data center to the
user workplace.
During this same period of time, geographically
dispersed elements of large organizations recognized a real-
time need to pass not only bulk files but also short
unstructured inquiries. As a result, data communications
requirements grew rapidly.
The Navy's largest logistics system, the Uniform
Automated Data Processing System-Stock Points (UADPS-SP),
11
was one organization affected by this proliferation of both
interactive and data transmission applications.
As an organization's data processing resources spread
out two problems come to the surface immediately:
1
)
How can the central processing site ensure that
only authorized users access processes or files?
2 How can the organization protect data during
transmission?
While these vulnerabilities existed to a limited extent in
the previous system they must now receive more attention.
B. FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITY SPECIFICATION
In 1978 the Office of Management and Budget issued
Circular A-71 [Ref. 1] requiring security specifications in
all new Automatic Data Processing (ADP) developments and
procurements. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Navy
have since updated their own instructions regarding ADP
security, to include a requirement for Activity ADP Security
Programs, risk analysis and accreditation of acceptable
protection prior to system operation [Ref. 2].
To date, the major security improvements made in the
field appear strongly influenced by the development of such
tools as threat, safeguard, compliance, and certification
checklists. A problem that has resulted is the development
of these checklists by individual activities for internal
use without efforts for sharing across the organization.
The principal reason for this appears to be the result of
12
instructions specifying "activity" level responsibility
[Ref. 2]. Large geographically dispersed projects like
SPLICE will require more organizational direction regarding
security due to the many connections between activities. It
would appear common procedures among SPLICE activities would
help.
C. WHY DELIVERED SYSTEMS DO NOT MEASURE UP?
Computer systems continue to arrive at activities with
significant gaps in security controls apparent. These
systems were apparently developed without a full under-
standing of organizational requirements. [Ref. 3]
Threats were never recognized by activities because
activities do not take time to think about things that only
"might" happen. "Too often, the question of data destruc-
tion or misappropriation goes unanswered until a disaster
occurs." [Ref. 4: p. 17]
Persons responsible for conducting a "Risk Analysis"
were possibly not experienced or did not take the time to
properly review potential problem areas due to the "press of
business". In the insurance industry, a need for insurance
should be established and the value of having a policy
quantified and compared to its cost. Security safeguards
are a form of insurance. Loss equates to what the
organization will give up should its data be compromised or
destroyed. Risk combines loss with probabilities that the
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threat will be realized. While high risk demands higher
security, without some form of quantification managers will
not know where to spend money on safeguards. Unfortunately
the largest threat and the one threat most systems tend to
ignore is posed by authorized users in systems lacking
effective audit trails [Ref. 5: p. 62].
Data value has not been quantified. Organizations that
have not taken or were not given the time to hierarchically
organize their data by value and potential for compromise
are finding it difficult to select appropriate safeguards
[Ref. 6].
Specifications do not fit requirements. Rather than
analyze their own activities, the user's specifications are
often developed only to those minimally required in written
instructions. The resulting systems are based on the
vendor's determination of security needs utilizing only
those specifications. These systems require expensive add-
on features, often causing more problems than they
alleviate. While many might argue that "non-specific"
specifications enable faster delivery, lower cost, and
increased industry participation the result can be
disappointing
.
Some organizations opt for a system meeting only end-
result processing requirements under perfect operating
conditions. One error or omission in input may bring the
operation to a standstill. Organizations not specific in
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making system security needs known leave security to the
discretion of the software designer. Since software focus
is on a comprehensive, efficient product, and security often
cuts into efficiency, designers tend toward the minimum
[Ref. 7].
An organization can also overspecify. If an
organization does not have the expertise to realize the
constraints their specifications will have on operations,
the result can be disaster. If every part of the system is
treated as critical without regard to risk or data value the
resulting product may be so slow that meaningful work cannot
be done. Overspecification can lead an organization into
believing their system to be invincible. This has been
termed the "Maginot Line Syndrome" [Ref. 8: p. 51]. This
may also result in neglect of other important administrative
controls
.
Personnel providing specifications often do not have
computer security expertise. Many activities have been
caught short by regulations requiring responsibility for
security to be vested in an official familiar with both ADP
and security [Ref. 1: p. 3]. Personnel are often assigned
who are familiar with ADP or security but not both.
Security personnel often are not computer security person-
nel. Many of our colleges and universities do not offer
courses dealing specifically with this subject and it
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appears general security expertise among ADP personnel is
suffering. Many activities do not pay individuals in this
position the salary they may draw elsewhere for their
computer experience alone.
Another problem results from reliance on military
officers for the security function. On arrival they have
little or no experience; just when that experience is
developed they transfer. An activity's security function
deserves continuity.
Personnel reviewing/approving specifications often have
erroneous perceptions of security. Many users and managers
consider security a dirty word.
"When enhanced security is mentioned, many people
immediately equate this to reduced capability, less
friendly operations, and restrictive personnel
practices." [Ref. 9: p. 93]
Most controls are resented: slowing users down; adding to
costs; and frequently not essential for work being done
[Ref. 10: p. 9]. It is those few applications needing
protection that must be brought in focus. Due to past
experience or "gut feelings", many security features have
been summarily cut from systems before development only to
be recognized during implementation or operation as
critical. Adding security then would likely be more
expensive and create a system that may not operate within
the user response requirements for which it was built. A
danger exists that the weakness just might be ignored.
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
To improve the overall security posture of any activity
all the above problems must be addressed simultaneously.
Qualified personnel providing effective specifications may
not overcome management bias. Adequate risk analysis won't
overpower poor safeguard specification or selection. The
organization must take a balanced approach to developing
corporate knowledge of security as well as security
controls. An NBS workshop on audit and security in 1978
concluded that security policy must be set and security
mechanisms must be put in place and be constantly evaluated
to assure effectiveness [Ref. 11: p. 56].
Threat recognition takes time and creativity. An
organization should identify common threats and leave only
identification of specific activity threats to the activity.
Besides published threat checklists, a valuable technique is
development of threat scenarios and analysis of their impact
on the activity. The scenario approach alone has been found
lacking in DOD attempts to ensure systems security by
detailing "Tiger Teams" to attempt penetration; later checks
of the system showed the Teams often left significant
vulnerabilities untested or the fix prescribed resulted in
new vulnerabilities [Ref. 11: p. 56]. Threats should not
be immediately dismissed out of hand. Threat assessment is
a challenge. This is a process where many creative
17
individuals should be involved; do not rely on the ideas of
one person.
Once threats are recognized their probability of
occurence should be judged. Since historical data most
likely is lacking here this judgement should be biased
toward their actual occurrence for an extra measure of
protection.
The loss value of data which would be compromised or
destroyed should the threat be realized must be computed.
Excellent suggestions regarding threat recognition/proba-
bility and loss determination have already been made for
SPLICE [Ref. 12: p. 24-63].
An excellent aid to identifying valued data resources is
the "Data Dictionary/Directory". Such a tool defines each
entity, its use, and its relationships and has been proposed
for SPLICE [Ref. 13]. Involvement in constructing a data
dictionary/directory for the activity ensures that both user
and designer will inspect usefulness of current data and
consider future requirements. The result will be a firm
base from which to select safeguards or specific security
features. Such aids can also assist in standardization
between sites.
Specifications must be improved. Current systems appear
to be placing too much emphasis on getting products to the
workplace with the idea of leaving the patching of security
to implementation and operational personnel. Lack of
18
specification detail convinces top management the safeguard
is unimportant.
Personnel involved in organizational security must be
qualified. If none are currently on board the organization
should seek professional outside assistance. This should
only be a temporary fix, organizations should rely on
outsiders for security only as a last resort. If expertise
cannot be found in the local labor market, internally
generated talent should be drawn on. Organizational
security requires continuity, therefore I would recommend
all security departments have more than one individual
familiar with requirements and procedures. On the other
hand, security safeguard specifics should be known to as few
individuals as possible to prevent employee attempts at
circumventing the system. Security manuals and specific
documentation should be kept out of general circulation.
Perceptions of security must be "adjusted" to conform to
system security needs. Both users and management must be
educated to view security as a "business" problem [Ref. 14:
p. 7]. Issues must be described to them in common business
terms [Ref. 4: p. 22]. Data must be viewed as an asset.
It will be difficult to convince users of security impor-
tance if top management is openly cold toward it. The
security department's first goal should thus be top manage-
ment support. Without authority from above the security
19
department's chance for successful system security is
greatly diminished, even if technical safeguards are in
place
.
"Management sets the moral climate of a company" [Ref.
15: p. 32] if upper level managers view security safe-
guards and procedures as unimportant or not applicable to
them, and if security is openly ignored, users will exhibit
similiar attitudes and behavior.
Users and management must be shown examples of
successful system approaches to security instead of the
inefficiency introduced by some add-on features. A source
of examples may be found in the recently created DOD
Computer Security Center's Evaluated Products List [Ref. 9:
p. 94]. The DOD Computer Security Center has additionally
put together the DOD Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation
Criteria to assist in organizational security development
[Ref. 11: p. 57].
E. HOW MUCH SECURITY IS ENOUGH ?
How secure any system actually is cannot be quantified
in any but relative terms and is based on both the environ-
ment and security safeguards in place. No safeguard or
combination of safeguards can guarantee 100% that data is
safe in a system. Any attempt to even approach this figure
utilizing present technology almost ensures that a system
cannot be used. At the other extreme, the most user
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friendly system would exhibit great vulnerabilities. What
every system security policy should ensure is a balance of
these two traits to a degree commensurate with the value of
data to be protected and system risks.
The private sector has not developed any ranking for
system security. The Department of Defense (DOD) has begun
classifying systems by security level but as yet have not
reviewed any systems meeting all criteria for one level and
no others. The question of how much security a system
should provide is still answered subjectively. Recent
trends toward a more rigorous approach at performing Risk
Assessments and selection of safeguards indicate that future
formal policies may soon be established. There are as many
opinions in the security industry of what constitutes
adequate security as there are products. "Enough" is a
matter of judgement, the judge being those who must
eventually pay the price of security controls or take the
risk of not applying them.
One method for specifying how much security to provide
for a system is the "Prudent Person Rule" [Ref. 8: p. 171]
The "person" is that individual given responsibility for an
organization's security. "Prudent" refers to his selection
of the same safeguards in use by "most" of the other
organizations in that industry. Supposedly, a loss occuring
after such safeguards are in place would not be blamed on
the prudent person but would instead be marked off as
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unavoidable. Organizations operating under this technique
need do little in the way of risk assessment as management
probably will not approve any controls their contemporaries
have not first embraced.
Another view of how much security is enough centers on
the assumption that the potential penetrator is a "reason-
able man" and would not spend more on obtaining data then
could be derived from it [Ref. 8: p. 53]. Here data value
is "specifically" derived (a judgement call) and security
controls are increased only to that point where the "reason-
able man" would give up attempts at access (a judgement
call). This technique too has a drawback, data of low value
to an outsider may be critical to an organization's
continued health and needs protection from accidental or
malicious destruction.
For most day-to-day users of a system, "enough" is
whatever allows one to get a job done in peace. Many users
would probably consider no controls adequate; it is thus the
responsibility of management to ensure that the user knows
what this could mean. While user opinions may be valuable
in defining just what interface a security control should
assume they should not be relied on to pass judgement on the
appropriateness of specific controls.
No one criteria should be relied on in determining the
•degree of security to employ, instead, it appeal's the best
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policy is to combine attributes of all. First it is
essential data value be somehow determined; value, not only
to an outsider, but to the firm's operation. Next, all
potential safeguards both physical and administrative should
be identified and costed out. There is nothing wrong with
reviewing what other organizations are doing (if the infor-
mation is available) so long as innovative approaches are
not ruled out.
"No single control can stop - or deter - the computer
criminal" [Ref. 16: p. 21]. A series of "package deals"
should be prepared so that top management decisions for a
system will be based on a system and not just a list of
safeguards
.
It has also been suggested that security be added one
piece at a time where systems managers have previously
balked at a comprehensive package [Ref. 14: p. 13]. While
this flys in the face of advocating built-in security, it
may be the only way security will be provided for a system
that already exists.
23
III. THE SPLICE SYSTEM
A. BACKGROUND
In late 1977 the Naval Supply Systems Command formally
recognized a need for data communications and processing
support for the Burroughs medium computer systems of the
UADPS-SP [Ref. 17: p. 3-1]. This system handles the bulk
of U.S. Navy logistics community ADP requirements. A rapid
growth in both number and type of computer applications
requiring an interface with the files maintained in UADPS-SP
Systems was occuring and was projected to accelerate. Many
of these applications were of a real-time interactive
nature. Many were running on other computer systems; some
long distances away from the UADPS-SP sites. The Burroughs
equipment, developed to operate in a batch environment, was
rapidly being saturated with these multitudes of interactive
processes and communications handling requirements [Ref. 13:
p. 2-2].
Computer compatibility had become a big problem. Even
at the same geographical location, different users in the
logistics community had developed systems with components
from a variety of manufacturers. Examples of major hardware
systems currently utilized in the various logistics





Defense Automatic Addressing System CDC 3500
(DAAS)
Defense Logistics Agency Network Comten 36xx
( DLANET
)
Automation of Procurement and Accounting
Data Entry
(APADE) P-E 3200
Navy Integrated Storage Tracking and Retrieval
(NISTARS) Tandem
Nonstop II





Uniform Automated Data Processing System
(UADPS-SP) B4800/4900
Integrated Disbursing and Accounting
(IDA) P-E 3230
Univac 1100
Inventory Control Point Network
(ICPNET) IBM
Naval Automated Transporation Documentation System
(NAVADS) P-E 3200
[Ref. 18: p. 2-7]
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These same logistics communities developed their own
local and long distance data communications networks
operating on a variety of protocols. Many of the
interconnections that were developing came as the result of
specific user initiative rather than any formal plan for
future connectivity. [Ref. 18: p. 2-3]
The SPLICE concept centers around a standard
hardware/software suite of minicomputers to be placed at
each logistics site. A common communications medium would
be chosen to interconnect all sites. Adaptive interfaces
would be developed to interconnect all the various systems
in a site's geographical area and enable their use of this
one network. SPLICE equipment and software was to provide a
failsafe fail/soft processing environment [Ref. 18: p. 2-5]
The SPLICE minicomputer would be tasked with processing
interactive applications and acting as a communications
front-end for the Burroughs. Video terminals would replace
keypunch entry. The Burroughs would be freed to handle
large file processing and reporting functions for which it
was originally intended. Eventual replacement of the UADPS-
SP hardware was to be eased by the flexibility SPLICE would
provide in opening selection to a wider range of ADP
equipment. [Ref. 17: p. 1-5] Figure 3.1 illustrates a

















B. THE SECURITY ISSUES
The various systems to be interconnected by SPLICE had
been developed independently with few technical security
controls imposed. Often, the locked door of their
respective environments and minimal password access controls
were apparently seen as sufficient. Some local systems in
the recent past employed but one password for all users.
Others lacked provisions for blanking out screen echo of
passwords on login. SPLICE is lightyears ahead of these
systems
.
I see the security problem confronting SPLICE as
fourfold:
1) how can users be identified to the system and will
the system be able to verify their identity;
2) how can users be kept from processes and data to
which they are not entitled;
3) how can data transmissions between sites be protected;
4) how can the system be monitored to ensure that
violations are not occuring.
Splice is to secure access at the terminal, user, and
transaction level [Ref. 18: p. 2-10]. How effectively it
does this remains to be seen.
C. SYSTEM SCOPE
SPLICE is targeted for 62 separate sites in the U.S. and
Pacific. At least two TANDEM processors will be in place at
each. [Ref. 18: p. 3-3] Capabilities to be supported
include:
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"* Inventory Control Point transfer of (bulk) data files
to
-another Inventory Control Point Inquiry,
-a Stock Point
-the Defense Automatic Addressing System ( DAAS )
;
* Contingency processing between the Inventory Control
Points
;
* Inventory Control Point Inquiry to the data bases at
-another Inventory Control Point
-a Stock Point, and
-the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) centers;
* Stock Point transfer of (bulk) data files to
-another Stock Point,
-an Inventory Control Point, and
-the Defense Automatice Addressing System (DAAS);
* Contingency processing capability between Stock
Points;
* Stock Point inquiry to the data bases at
-another Stock Point,
-an Inventory Control Point,
-the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) centers;
* Users from outside of the Stock Point and Inventory
Control Point communities require inquiry capability
into the data bases of Inventory Control Points
and/or DLA centers."
[Ref. 17: p. 1-13].
If required the system will link logisitics organizations
with other components in DOD folowing development of
appropriate Defense Data Network (DDN) Protocols [Ref. 19:
p. 8-1]. Figure 3.2 illustrates SPLICE system connections.
D. CURRENT TOPOLOGY
SPLICE contracts were awarded to the Federal Data
Corporation (FDC). SPLICE is being developed on the Tandem



























SNAP I II I
NAS Key West
SPLICENET [Ref. 17 : p. 1-151
Figure 3 2
30
Software to be utilized in the TANDEM operating system is a
combination of native Tandem products (i.e. GUARDIAN,
ENCOMPASS, EXPAND) and customized modules (i.e. Security
Access System (SAS), System Monitor (SMON)). SPLICE sites
will communicate with each other over DDN I in a closed
community mode utilizing the X.25 protocol. The SPLICENET is
to eventually go to a full DDN suite of protocols to enable
interconnection with other users. SPLICE sites will
communicate with other logisitics communities over a variety
of dial-up and dedicated circuits. SPLICE computers will
connect with their local community of users via NETEX
software and Network System Corporation's HYPERchannel , a
system of microprocessor-based adaptors and coaxial cable
enabling computers from various manufacturers to communicate
at high speed. [ Re f . 17: Chap. 5]
E. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Smooth transition to a standard communications
environment will be hampered by some of the same policies
being used to lower processing conversion risks. SPLICE
will be implemented over a period of years. Many interim
communications connections will be made and maintained
during this period. In a system such as SPLICE, where risk
quantification is difficult, justification for expensive
technical security countermeasures for these "interim"
connections will be hard to sell.
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The number and variety of connections will also present
a problem for control of access. Identification and
maintenance of appropriate access authorization lists will
be difficult. An excellent ADP security plan at one
installation will not prevent unauthorized access from other
sites where security is compromised. Many terminal sites
will not be receiving the upgraded security features in the
TANDEM system for several years. Finally, other logistics
communities are not moving rapidly toward DDN implementation
and their own networks may remain in place for sometime.
[ Ref. 19]
F. SITE SECURITY
As SPLICE is implemented at each site most of the
existing terminal equipment, controllers, and peripherals
are to be phased out or connected directly to the TANDEM.
Only equipment tied to the TANDEM will be covered under its
security access management process in SAS. Terminals
remaining on the Burroughs and other local systems will
continue to have their own capabilities but will not have
authority to order processing by the TANDEM or access other
sites [Ref. 17 p. 1-4]. Physical and administrative
security controls will be unique to each site. Except for
SAS passwords, few other technical countermeasures are




Data processed within the UADPS-SP system that will be
transmitted between sites is at most sensitive business
data. Individual applications within sites include
inventory control, ordering, payroll, and contract
administration. While administrative separation of duties
ensures that little would be of benefit to an individual
employee, a conspiracy could develop to profit from data
manipulation. Additionally, individuals with access to a
terminal could cause considerable damage to programs and
files if access is not controlled to those specific objects.
The last attempt at Security Risk Assessment formally
made on the system level for SPLICE appears to have been
made in 1980 [Ref. 20]. Appropriate risk analysis and file
value quantification are still not available. The integrity
of this data is important in accounting for millions of
dollars in supply transactions within UADPS-SP. Some of the
data is critical for day to day operations, some is not.
Since many controls are not appropriate for every system,
they need to be chosen taking value into consideration. It
would seem that a system wide data value quantification
effort is needed so each site is using the same figures in
activity security plans.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF DDN ON SPLICE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
A. DDN, THE NETWORK TO BE UTILIZED
The Defense Data Network (DDN) is an evolving data
telecommunications network utilizing packet switching and
slated to eventually handle most Department of Defense (DOD)
long haul data transmission requirements for both classified
and unclassified user communities. Many heterogeneous
systems can effectively communicate with each other using a
DOD standard Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and
Internet Protocol (IP); systems utilizing an X.25 protocol
will be supported only until DOD standards are developed
[Ref. 21: p. 2/3]. DDN I developed out of a 1981
evaluation of the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN II)
versus the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network
(ARPANET) technologies. The ARPANET technologies were
chosen as a basis for DDN in April 1982. Subsequent DOD
policy decisions require all DOD users, having a long haul
data transmission requirement to register as subscribers
with the DDN and begin development of appropriate interfaces
[Ref. 22]. Decisions would be made on which activities were
to be granted a waiver. SPLICE was required to subscribe
and use DDN.
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B. DDN, ORIGINAL TOPOLOGY
Initially- / DDN was to be a network of switching centers
protected in facilities classified at the secret level or
above. Trunk lines would connect to other switches.
Subscribers could co-locate or connect remotely to a switch
in a variety of ways. The network was to have highly
redundant routing, be easily reconfigured, and ensure
extremely high reliability and message delivery. Data
security was to be enhanced by using both link encryption
through military grade (KG-84) encryption hardware and
community of interest (COI ) end-to-end encryption through
Internet Private Line Interface (IPLI) devices. A new
multi-level security project (BLACKER) was to be
incorporated into DDN in the late 1980' s. Until then, each
COI was to treat all data transmissions at one system high
level. All sites were to receive similar modular
hardware/software and interface services. [Ref. 23]
C. DDN, ACTUAL EVOLUTION
The DDN, like most projects, has changed course to deal
-with the realities of implementation. These changes have
made planning a bit difficult for subscribers. As the
transmission medium and interfaces are critical to SPLICE
success, it has had to remain flexible in the specification
of security requirements. The DDN critical IPLI devices
were not being developed as fast as originally planned and
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the number of subscribers not yet connected was growing. In
1982 DDN was reevaluated and a decision was made to split
classified and unclassified communities. The unclassified
segment within the continental U.S. was to become MILNET.
Less restrictive requirements were applied to this MILNET
segment as of non-military grade encryption standards on the
trunk and deletion of IPLI devices. This decision allowed
rapid expansion of the MILNET portion. The classified
segment and overseas portions of the network remained under
the previous standards. "Gates" were set up to allow
classified data transmission through MILNET in super-
encrypted form. Unclassified users would never pass traffic
through or into the classified net. Classified/unclassified
segments are optimized independently of each other. [Ref.
24: p. 2] Figure 4.1 illustrates the current SPLICE/MILiMET
topology.
D. DDN ENCRYPTION
In MILNET, commercial grade Data Encryption Standard
(DES) devices were chosen to implement trunk link
transmission encryption. DES encryption is discussed in
greater detail in Chapter VII. While the trunk is so
protected, DDN has made DES protection of remote user access





















Figure 4 1 [Ref. 24)
Unclassified Segment of DDN
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E. PHYSICAL SITE, PERSONNEL
With removal of KG-84 and IPLI provisions in MILNET,
switches may now be placed in facilities regarded only as
"restricted". This opens a substantial number of locations
to switch access at a lower physical security cost. The
personnel cleared to work in restricted facilities are not
as carefully screened and the risk to both switching
equipment and traffic is greater. No restrictions have been
placed on configuration placement within a facility.
Since DES hardware at the switch will be tamper
protected, data stream security outside the switches can be
measured by the physical security afforded the keying
material. Restrictions on keying material allow storage in
a secured container on site if access is limited to
no more than 10 ADP-I critical personnel. [Ref. 24: p. 20]
Ten seems a bit high, even for trusted personnel.
F. ELECTRICAL EMMISIONS
DDN equipment will conform to TEMPEST standards [Ref. 24:
p. 10]. It is the subscriber's responsibility to protect
access lines and organizational equipment. In cases where
the nearest DDN switches are a distance away, DES encryption
is optional.
G. ACCESS, ROUTING, DELIVERY
DDN documentation clearly states that the subscriber is
ultimately responsible for access control.
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"Network facilities in DDN I will not verify... that an
individual user (person or process) who attempts to
access a subscriber, either directly or through another
subscriber, has valid access rights to that subscriber."
[Ref. 2 3]
The DDN requires all subscriber hosts to set access control
with userid/password authentication or their equivalent
[Ref. 24 p. 17]. Splice access control mechanisms must
abide by this. DDN assumes responsibility for proper data
routing within a particular unclassified COI by comparing a
COI header field in each packet with tables maintained at
each switch. As with most physical systems, mistakes or
problems can occur. Misdelivery as a result of
hardware/software failure, attacks on the DDN segment, or
_ o
misaddressing has a low probability (5.5 x 10 ) [Ref. 25:
p. 5],
H. THE SPLICE RESPONSE
The decrease in transmission and physical security in
the interim DDN MILNET utilized by SPLICE have not met with
any increase in security by SPLICE. While performance should
remain a key element in SPLICE transactions over DDN, secur-
ity doesn't deserve a "back burner". IPLI devices were
expected to have no significant effect on performance (the
equivalent of transfer through an additional switch)
[Ref. 9: p. 40]. DES encryption would not be much
different.
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Without the IPLI devices, SPLICE is not protected by
End-to-End encryption. This is balanced by SPLICE non-
operability with most other DOD components due to the lack
of a "full service" interface because TANDEM software built
over X.25 provides SPLICE sites interoperability without
full DDN standard protocols [Ref. 23: p. 14]. SPLICE
computers will connect with the DDN via Host Front End
Processor mode.
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V. SECURITY CONTROLS IN SPLICE
A. SPECIFICATION
SPLICE security requirements originally specified in Navy
solicitation documents, were followed by Federal Data
Corporation in its development of the Security Access System
(SAS) and System Monitor (SMON) software. The development
of these systems is detailed in a variety of documents
[Ref. 27: p. 1].
Primary System requirements included the following or
their functional equivalent: [paraphrased from Ref. 26]
- provide restricted access to processes through a user
logon requiring a user ID and nondisplayed password;
- distinctly group users to selected files and processes;
(p. 68)
- record Security Violations in a log showing who, what,
when, and where attempted;
- protect all programs and data files to prevent
compromise/destruction;
- protect processes or data in primary memory from being
accessed/destroyed without authority;
- restrict secondary storage requests to file referenced;
- determine accessor mode by access authorization of ID;
- allow only the central system operator authority to
access, establish, modify, or delete user ID's and their
authorizations
;
- allow storage and maintenance of at least 5000 unique
user ID's per site;
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- collect user ID in accounting for each process;
- validate terminals and users for transaction level
access
;
- allow Transaction Processing System control of field
level access;
- control file access/use by password;
- require a file to have a password, expiration date, and
owner when created. Allow owner right to assign access
authorization for file to others and assign, change, or
remove passwords for any file owned;
(p. 69)
- provide read only, read/write, execute,
read/write/delete, and read/write/execute/delete
authorization levels to files;
- restrict deletion to expiration unless first confirming
need with Central System Operator/authorized user;
- allow password legibility only to security officer;




- distinguish between at least two levels of process
control capability ... central system and user;
(p. 94)
- provide access control by terminal and user to the
transaction level;
(p. 93)
- maintain security and integrity of itself and other
software components;
- limit configuration access to authorized users;




The solicitation document also included reference to use
of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) for all proposed
products/services to be provided with a cryptographic
capability [Ref. 26: p. 43].
These requirements were formalized in the late 1970's.
Changes have been made during project development and
implementation
.
The SAS and SMON subsystems were designed to bring off-
the-shelf Tandem operating system software up to access
control, routing, and system control requirements of SPLICE.
In the transition SPLICE inherited in-place Tandem Software
characteristics. Figure 5.1 illustrates elements
interacting with SAS.
B. COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT
SPLICE access control is maintained by processes acting
on elements of the Security Access System. The SAS was
developed under contract by FDC to meet password protection
and routing specifications noted above. Through SAS, users
are able to logon when authenticated by password and may
then perform transactions or call programs as authorized
after checks by the Terminal Management Subsystem on SAS
databases. SAS overlays the TANDEM GUARDIAN operating
system to provide the above features to terminals connected
through PATHWAY as well as those having access to the

















thus identical to features already in GUARDIAN. SAS
specifically authenticates a user, checks both his authority
and that of the terminal he utilizes, and optionally routes
the user to an authorized destination. SAS contains the
Security Access Utility Program (SAUP) for both maintenance
of a Security Access Profile database (SAP) and a query
capability generating various security reports. SAS
operates with the System Monitor (SMON) subsystem for
maintenance of security logs, monitoring of user logon/
logoff, and monitoring of system loads and configurations.
File Security is maintained by FDC's File Security System
with changes possible through File Utility Programs
[Ref. 17: p. 9-7] Figure 5.2 depicts logical flow
through the Tandem system to DDN and other components.
The first SAS component to be reviewed is the SAP
database. SAP is organized into two types of files.
Relational Files hold data related to specific users,
terminals, programs, transactions, classes of programs/
transactions, and routing. Transformational files are
organized in matrix form to allow easy combinatorial
operations. [Ref. 27: p. 7]
The user file contains a record for each user and meets
SPLICE requirements by listing each user by a unique user ID
key with fields for User Logon name, password, authorized
program and transaction classes, an optional user initial
routing class, an operator identification number for
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SPLICE System Logical Flow
Figure 3.2 iRef 17: p 9-31
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entering the Terminal Applications Processing system, and
activity code data. An additional field exists for user
read, write, execute, and purge default file security. The
default system will determine other's access to files
"owned" by that user. Individual file ownership and
security can be changed using the File Utility Program.
Access can be restricted to local security officer
(super. super ) , local or remote owner, local or remote group,
any local or remote user, local owner only or any local
user. [Ref. 27] These restrictions seem to meet SPLICE
specifications
.
The Terminal File contains a record for each terminal by
its PATHWAY filename in ASCII with fields for authorized
program and transaction classes [Ref. 27].
A Routing Class File contains records by class
specifying choices for initial and TPS routing [Ref. 27].
An Activity Code Description File describes all possible
activity codes in the system and a User Activity Table
lists up to 65 activities for each user [Ref. 27].
Program and Transaction Description Files are used with
Access Files to specify Program and Transaction Classes.
Classes specified in Access Files are combined in Matrix
Files to determine specific user/terminal combinations.
A Remote Passwords file is maintained with records keyed
by User ID and fields for Remote Systems (other SPLICE
sites) and remote passwords. Through EXPAND a user in one
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site may access authorized programs, transactions, or files
in all other SPLICE sites.
The SAUP allows designated security personnel to create
and maintain the SAP through use of preformatted screens and
selection menus. The SAUP can only be utilized by security
and meets SPLICE specifications regarding such a
restriction.
Either report or maintenance options can be chosen using
function keys. Report options allow the security officer a
rapid means of reviewing all program/transaction
descriptions, all program/ transaction classes for particular
users, all activity descriptions, all activities by user,
and various combinations of password listings. Maintenance
options allow additions, changes, and deletions to SAP
files. The preformatted screens both speed maintenance
functions and reduce possibility of errors carried into the
access control system by allowing only certain combinations
of numbers or letters to be placed in each field.
Additional controls exist between files to prevent Program
or Transaction entities from being deleted from the
description file but not the class and to prevent undefined
Programs or Transactions from being added to a class.
Registration of new users, terminals, programs,
transactions, activities, etc can only be made by security
personnel under order from responsible workcenters. Changes
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must also be documented by source. By far the biggest
problem for each site security officer is maintenance of
password features; FDC is responding to requests for
assistance here.
C. SAS OPERATIONS
SAS operates through use of a variety of server and
requestor structures which will not be discussed in detail
here. Users initially enter the system through a LOGON
procedure and are authenticated by the password they
provide. At this same time the terminal being utilized is
identified to the system by a process transparent to the
user. An error in LOGON currently results in one of two
messages: "USER LOGON ID NOT FOUND IN SYSTEM" or "INVALID
PASSWORD" [Ref. 27: p. C-l] While these do provide a
degree of friendliness they are not recommended in a System
accessable to remote terminals as they allow information to
be gained by persons attempting to "crack the system".
[Ref. 28] A more generic message requesting repetition of
the LOGON process would be superior. Each error in the
LOGON attempt results in a write through SMON to system
security logs thus meeting original SPLICE specifications
for such a feature. Security log notification does not
automatically result in a corresponding alarm in the
security office or at operator consoles, even on multiple
errors or attempts. The system does provide a degree of
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protection against computer assisted attempts at cracking
the system by allowing only three unsuccessful LOGON
attempts and then locking out that terminal for three
minutes. This feature is highly recommended by many
security experts [Ref. 28: p. 20].
The SAS logon results in a transfer of user/terminal
authorization "capability list" data from the SAP database
to a Security Access Table created and maintained for the
duration of this session (LOGON to LOGOFF). All future
session authorization verification checks are made against
this table. Access will only be granted when both "(USER
ACCESS MATRIX) and (TERMINAL ACCESS MATRIX)" are true for
the process requested [Ref. 27: p. 10]. Access results in
initial program/transaction routing as provided in routing
profiles for that user, or in display of a SELECT menu on
the user's terminal. This SELECT menu contains options
available for that user.
The SAS system allows checks to be inserted in various
SPLICE applications to verify user/terminal authorization
during a session at branching points in particular programs.
Code must be inserted into the programs at that point
directing the process to a TANDEM library routine
ALLOWTRANS. This routine checks authorization against SAT
and disallows unauthorized activity. All user attempts to




D. LEVEL OF SECURITY PROVIDED
The TANDEM security features implement a "Security-
Kernel" type architecture on the system. Security appears
good if it is assumed the Operating System will not be
compromised. An additional problem may result if
applications are not coded to incorporate ALLOWTRANS.
SPLICE specifications appear to have been met but they may
not be sufficient. All transmissions between terminals,
processors, and initial DDN switches are open to intercept
yielding password and other data. Additionally, security
files may be vulnerable in their unencrypted state in the
operating system through disk dumps and such.
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VI . SURVEY OF AUTHENTICATION
A. REASONS FOR AUTHENTICATION
Authentication is some method for verifying an identity.
While authentication has applications in access control to a
facility, access control into an on-line computer system is
the topic addressed in this chapter. Just as a bank would
not wish for strangers to wander through their vault, a
computer system manager would not want improperly identified
personnel on-line from a terminal or remote site. Not only
is the integrity of data in the system at stake, the
existence of that data is threatened. An improperly
identified user on the system may, by the identity assumed,
be allowed access to all data and applications the genuine
user was cleared for. Audit trails here would point to the
compromised user but not the real culprit. Without reliable
user authentication, even strict security access authoriza-
tion schemes can only limit damage or compromise. Data
having value deserves protection.
SPLICE installations require authentication for several
reasons. Not all data entry/output points fall within the
physical security afforded the central processing site.
Users cannot all be observed visually (a form of
authentication) because of this remoteness from operating
personnel. SPLICE access requests will enter the central
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system from both local and remote terminals and by dial-up
or dedicated lines from other sites [Ref. 19: p. 9-3]. To
ensure viability of access authorization, SPLICE must
require authentication.
B. WHAT CAN BE USED TO AUTHENTICATE?
Identify verification techniques use one or more of the
following three classes of data:
" 1) something a person knows;
2) something a person has;
3) something a person is."
[Ref. 12: p. 66]
Something known includes passwords and background
question-and-answer techniques. Something held is
exemplified by badges or keys. Something a person is
utilizes measurement and matching of some physiological
attribute with a standard. SPLICE authentication and
commercially available alternatives or possible enhancements
will be discussed throughout this chapter.
C. SOMETHING A PERSON KNOWS
Passwords are the best known form of user authentication
and are almost universally accepted. Passwords were
specified as part of the system user logon procedure in
original SPLICE specifications [Ref. 26: p. 68]. With the
selection of TANDEM computers and their operating system for
SPLICE sites, user identification and password structures
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present in GUARDIAN software were applied to meet this
specification. The Security Access System (SAS) was
developed and added to GUARDIAN. SAS thus provides
password authentication over PATHWAY connected terminals at
a site. SPLICE specifications specified no password length.
Since the GUARDIAN system is configured for up to eight
alphanumeric characters this became the defacto standard
directed by equipment/software choice. Eight is at the
upper end of recommended lengths and provides high security
against most password compromises by random manual or
computer assisted guessing schemes. Further protection is
afforded by a requirement for random generation [Ref. 21].
Most password systems carry with them a high
administrative workload resulting from password changes and
users forgetting their password and contacting security for
help. As users will often be remote from the security
office time will be wasted in transporting passwords by
person or mail. Changing passwords regularly may also lead
users to write down their password rather than rely on
memory, potentially compromising the system should passwords
be lost or seen by another.
Efforts to make password generation and distribution
less of a chore on administrative personnel were not
included in the original SPLICE specifications. With
installation already taking place this need is now being
54
addressed. A random password generation program and method
to automatically replace passwords in authentication/
authorization tables will take the burden of remote
generation and manual entry tasks off the small staffs in
site security offices. The ability to automatically address
and load the hundreds of letters utilized for password
distribution would also be appreciated. Without these aids,
a timed replacement of passwords at frequent intervals will
be extremely labor intensive and possibly involve others in
password system administration increasing the possibility of
compromise. As sites each have the capability of storing
and maintaining 5000 unique user ID/passwords it can be seen
this administrative assistance is desirable.
Vulnerabilities seen in the SPLICE password system
principally rest in data access during transmission and
storage. The terminal to CPU transmissions and the security
files are not encrypted. No portions of the data
transmission medium from DDN switches out of DON into SPLICE
are encrypted. Transmissions containing user identification
and passwords in combination are thus subject to compromise.
Question-and-answer type authentication systems are both
a burden on security and potentially short lived.
Background dialogs would have to be developed at user
registration. Such background data is more easily
determined than a password and the logon delay required by
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several exchanges would alienate users. Storage overhead
would also result and the registration of remote users would
be a problem.
The password system is here to stay even in combination
with new technologies and should be supported. Users must
be educated to its importance and necessity. Projections
that the security features being provided by SAS (under
OPNAVINST 5239. 1A requirements) will be seen by users as
"distasteful" and "inconvenient" [Ref. 17: p. 11-9] implies
a lack of user understanding of security.
D. SOMETHING A PERSON HAS
The principal devices found in commercial applications
from this category read magnetically coded tokens issued to
users to authenticate user identity. Possession by the user
must be assumed and is the principal shortfall of this
entire category. It has therefore been recommended that
other authentication techniques be utilized in consonance
with it. [Ref. 29: p. 13] The authentication device can
be incorporated into the terminal or placed alongside but as
yet still appears expensive. While cards may employ many
types of coding they are still subject to compromise over
time and should be recoded at regular intervals just as
passwords should be replaced. SPLICE sites currently use
coded cards to open entry door locks at some facilities, but
system logon has not been an application.
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New "smart cards" are developing which promise a
significant increase in data storage for authentication by
incorporation of computer chips into the card. Micro Card
Technologies, Inc. is selling such cards in bulk at $3.50 to
$4.00 [Ref. 30: p. 46]. Such cards could be used for
access control, encryption, and even personnel data file
information.
E. SOMETHING A PERSON IS
This category uses measurement of various physiological
characteristics for identity verification. Techniques
showing the most promise include measurements based on
fingerprints, hand geometry, signature, speech, and retinal
pattern. Most other attributes have been ruled out due to
unacceptable delays in measuring/processing or high error
rates
.
A user first submits to some appropriate measurement
test for the attribute sought under observation by security
personnel. The measurement device transforms this input
into a digital pattern which would then be stored in the
security database under a key identifying that user. This
"registration" process need not be repeated unless the
attribute used is subject to change. Each subsequent access
attempt requires that a user first identify himself to the
system with the key under which his pattern is stored. Some
systems will even search for recognition purposes without a
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personnel ID number. The user next utilizes a measurement
device to produce a new digital signature. This is compared
by the system with the registered pattern; a match opens the
channel to access authorization.
This category is not without its problems. In using
personal attributes for identity verification there is a
difficulty in performing precise, repeatable measurements on
the human body [Ref. 29: p. 15]. Because of the
measurement problem, many attributes are not feasible
alternatives due to a lack of suitable reference points from
which to initiate matching. A second problem is lack of
variety within a population (Height and weight can be
ruled out because they cannot uniquely verify a user
identity). Attributes may be so common a device could not
be "tuned" to discriminate between users.
Systems must refrain from making 100% positive
identification and instead set thresholds for
rejection/acceptance based on individual site judgements.
If verification settings are too high genuine users will be
rejected; this is known as Type I error. If settings are
relaxed to decrease Type I errors, the acceptance of falsely
identified personnel Type II errors increase. [Ref. 29: p.
16].
One technique to reduce manual intervention by security
is the allowance of several access attempts. This has the
same effect as changing threshold settings unless the user
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is forced to go through a "best two out of three" type
scenario. Measurement accuracy usually requires
sophisticated devices. While a central operation may well
be able to pay for this it would not be justified in a
decentralized system with numerous terminals unless data
value is extraordinary. A hopeful trend is seen in input
devices rapidly dropping in cost. Due to the probability of
errors in verification even in accurately measured systems,
it appears the best policy will be using this category of
authentication only with another method, i.e. passwords.
Automatic speaker verification systems are now on the
market. Products now make allowances for noisy background
environments and some normal physiological change in the
user's voice. Most systems are appearing packaged with
automatic speech recognition products requiring
significantly greater processing. Both will find wide user
acceptance if proven reliable.
During "registration" a user would respond to prompts
with a specific set of utterances several times; the
computer would establish a pattern for each. During logon
the user would receive prompts on screen to repeat a
specific subset combination of these. This prompt could be
randomly chosen from the security list to prevent ruses such
as playing back recordings of the user from being
successful. The digital voice prints would be matched and
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if successful the user would be passed to access authority-
areas .
Vendors of current systems for both voice recognition
and verification claim reliability factors from 97-99% [Ref.
31: p. 96]. Threshold currently markets a system aimed at
Hewlett-Packard PCs and Televideo T950 terminals. Votan is
currently marketing multibus units utilizing an IBM PC.
Many other manufacturers are entering the marketplace and it
is expected that costs will drop rapidly as volume,
technological refinement, and competition come into play.
With a centrally processed comparison, remote terminals
would require little more than a voice input device. Many
Security experts expect voice authentication will be brought
to market quickly [Ref. 30: p. 46]. This technique
deserves close consideration.
A device manufactured by Palmguard Inc., utilizes a
user's palmprint for authentication. The model PG-2001
remote terminal can supposedly be used with any host
computer and is alledged to reduce type I errors to less
than 1% and type II (false accept) to .00025% [Ref. 32: p.
37]. The terminal records palmprints and compares current
user prints with those of the registered user. One other
notable feature is the recording of print files in the
mainframe vs. the terminal; allowing no limit on the number
of users registered and lowering device price. The Pg-2001
follows a logon sequence similiar to that previously
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discussed. If a match is verified the user's
terminal/controller is given an open path into the system.
Logs are kept automatically of all attempted accesses.
A system using the retinal eye pattern as its record
promises fast, accurate, and secure high level
identification of personnel attempting to access a facility
or computer system. The Eye Dentification System 7.5 from
EyeDentify Inc. is currently marketed in a single standalone
unit for $10,000. Registration of up to 1,200 personnel is
possible. One key advantage of the system is speed. A user
can be registered in approximately 30 seconds. Users
receive a personnel identification number (PIN) which they
would enter on a touchtone-type key pad integral to the
unit. The user would then look into the same double lens
eye camera on which registration took place and a low
intensity infrared beam would be bounced off the retina.
The system takes 320 measurements along a 450° circular scan
and creates from this a 40 byte signature. This would be
matched with the one taken on registration. Using the PIN,
verification takes an average of 1.5 seconds. Without it
recognition is still possible without liason from security
by trying again. The vendor claims Type I error rates as
low as .1% (rejection of user) and Type II rates as low
as .0001% [Ref. 33]. Problems related to the eye are also
rarely a concern as the retinal pattern is more stable and
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unique than a fingerprint. Bloodshot eyes and even most
contact lenses reportedly will not interfere. Particular
problems can, as with most systems, be tuned out by widening
threshold settings for that individual, but security
suffers
.
If all users operated from but a few areas this system
would seem ideal. The need for keys, badges, or easily
compromised combinations or passwords is virtually
eliminated. SPLICE, unfortunately, is not centralized.
F. DOES SPLICE AUTHENTICATION SUFFER?
Utilizing only password and terminal identifiers is by
no means positive identity verification. Even though the
password does not appear on screen it is a simple matter (if
an insider) to simply watch fellow worker's fingers on the
keyboard as they logon. In the past, site security officers
have found users sometimes share their passwords with
others to simplify work... this problem may still well
appear
.
While positive verification of user's is difficult, some
SPLICE applications may demand it. Without a good
verification technique, system audit trials are useless.
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VII . ISSUES IN FILE AND TRANSMISSION PROTECTION
A. WHAT IS ENCRYPTION?
Encryption is a technique used to render electronically-
coded data unintelligible to all but authorized recipients
most commonly through use of some transformational algorithm
based on a particular data key. Of the various systems for
accomplishing this, the Data Encryption Standard (DES
)
endorsed by the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) is by far
the most widely accepted. DES is also mandated for Federal
ADP Systems employing encryption for the protection of
sensitive yet unclassified data. [Ref. 34]
The DES algorithm is based on 56 bits of a 64 bit key.
The remaining bits are used in the error detection
mechanism. The key size ensures high level security as it
results in "70 quadrillion" possible key combinations.
[Ref. 34]. Even with DES in common use efforts to derive
the key would be difficult. As even high security may be
broken, double encryption would make DES almost impossible
to break.
Encryption systems have been designed around the
distribution of keys. Data is encrypted utilizing one key
and decrypted when necessary utilizing a corresponding key.
Users must have the proper keys. Unauthorized personnel
must be denied access to keys. The security and operability
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of the system thus boils down to adequate key control and
distribution.
B. ATTACKS ON DATA
Data is vulnerable to both active and passive attacks in
an encrypted system [Ref. 35: p. 169]. Even a level of
encryption leaves certain vulnerabilities if not effectively
employed. The form these attacks take and encryption
techniques to counteract them will differ in every part of a
system.
Active attacks take the form of transmissions from an
attacker with intent to misinform or deny service to
legitimate users. Encryption can be used to ensure that an
attacker cannot deliver understandable information of his
own creation. Encryption alone will not prevent an attacker
from recording earlier data streams and injecting them into
the line later, so it is a good idea to change keys
frequently. In an effort to authenticate transmissions it
is also important that messages be assigned sequence numbers
by the protocol level they are flowing through. Encryption
provides an effective measure of active attack detection
when properly utilized and can point security personnel to
the point of attack or at least allow the system an
opportunity to shut down the line before damage is done.
[Ref. 29: p. 23]
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Passive attacks take the form of eavesdropping by
wiretap or radiation monitoring. Once a signal can be
monitored information can be gathered to mount an active
attack or achieve the attacker's purpose through other
means. Placing a tap between a user terminal and the main
processor may lead to compromise of user passwords [Ref. 29:
p. 22]. For only a few dollars and a small amount of
knowledge most communications lines can be compromised. If
an organization does not take steps to protect transmissions,
almost any Radio Shack customer can be a potential threat.
Where transmission lines leave an activity their integrity
ends. Only encryption can be relied on to prevent data
compromise over unprotected lines.
C. WHAT SHOULD BE ENCRYPTED?
Data that is of high value or sensitive content should
be protected whenever its physical security cannot be
guaranteed. Encryption schemes became popular only after
numerous high value losses in Electronic Funds Transfer
(EFT) systems received wide press coverage in the 1970's.
The DES algorithm became a defacto standard in many large
banking systems: Bank of America; Chase Manhattan; etc.
[Ref. 36: p. 86].
SPLICE exhibits physical vulnerabilities in areas
relating to both data transmission and on/off-line storage.
Data of value can be found in SPLICE applications involving
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the ordering and billing of goods as well as in local
applications for contract administration and payroll. Data
of a sensitive nature in SPLICE also includes local and
remote logon conversations and the actual site security
files
.
D. WHEN SHOULD ENCRYPTION BE EMPLOYED?
Once the determination has been made that data deserves
protection, the physically vulnerable points in the system
should be identified. In SPLICE, data transmissions occur
between terminals and the TANDEM processors, between
processors and output devices, and between processors and
memory. In SPLICE connections to other sites or remote
terminals, transmissions are made over both dedicated and
dial-up lines. In SPLICE connections to DDN, transmissions
occur from TANDEM to the nearest DDN switch and between DDN
switches. All these links are potential targets for
compromise.
The only SPLICE links presently protected by encryption
are the DDN links between switches. DDN controls key
material. While the costs of encrypting every link system
wide may be too much to bear, specific vulnerabilities might
be addressed by identifying the most critical. There is a
need for this examination in SPLICE. If passwords can be
easily deciphered anyone can enter the system and completely
circumvent "audit trail" effectiveness. SPLICE should not
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rely on DDN or any outside agency to ensure their own data
confidentiality.
In a 1981 Security survey of both large and small data
processing activities across a broad spectrum of government
and business 39% of the respondents reported use of some
type of encryption [Ref. 37: p. 42-46]. While such surveys
show valuable trends among security conscious users it would
probably not be fair to say "39% of all DP organizations" as
the majority of non-respondents probably use little
security. A 1982 survey of 43 similiar organizations in the
Dallas-Fort Worth area showed only a 20% use of some form of
data encryption [Ref. 38: p. 25]. Survey results can be of
value in pointing to directions being taken by
contemporaries but should not be used as the final word for
a unique organization.
E. THE COSTS OF ENCRYPTION
Encryption can be implemented in hardware or software
depending on organization requirements. Encryption
devices are becoming more affordable as the market expands.
Initial device expense is not a significant factor in
selection of this technique. Numerous commercial products
are now affordably priced [Figure 7.1].
"While NBS DES chips are only $10 or so, the need to
generate, distribute, store keys, and integrate
encryption into communications protocols, electronic
mail, and file systems is non-trivial." [Ref. 39 ]
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Table 7.1 [Ref. 36: p. 84]
DATA-ENCRYPTION SAMPLER
Vendor Product
























up to 64 Kpbs
Line security;
includes DES chip
up to 9600 bps
Racal-Milgo Datacryptor II Line security;
includes DES chip













bps to 64 Kbps
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Besides the above administrative and design burdens
encryption imposes an additional overhead, decreased
performance. Software implementations tend to be much
slower than hardware and have not gained as wide an
acceptance. If a system has been designed to meet user
response time requirements without encryption it will
probably fail to meet them when encryption is added-on.
This is the primary reason encryption should be
considered before system development.
Encryption does not guarantee data safety. If a key is
lost, the data "protected" by it may be lost forever. It is
a good idea to lessen risk of this occurring by using
different keys for a backup copy. Key security is a major
administrative burden and can lead to operational as well as
security problems should it be handled improperly.
Another cost of security is the burden placed on
reorganization and recovery. [Ref. 40: p. 419]. If the key
is being automatically changed by the system over time a
method must be in place to backtrack far enough for restart.
Additionally, elements in one area must have a capability to
rapidly communicate changes to other affected components.
Key distribution places an administrative burden on the
organization and can disrupt operations if not responsive to
rapid change should current keys be compromised. It is
important that details of distribution be worked out before
a system is obtained to ensure that the security office is
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aware of the additional responsibilities. Key distribution
is usually acomplished utilizing a courier, registered mail,
or other secured communications channels [Ref. 19: p. 167].
F. ENCRYPTION METHODS
Two basic encryption methods are in widespread use. In
block ciphering, information is encrypted in blocks as it
passes through the encryption point. In stream ciphering, a
steady stream of encrypted signal is continously transmitted
whether a real message has arrived or not. Each method has
advantages not found in the other.
Block ciphers are efficient where message segments are
easily broken out of traffic. While protecting data well
they are still more vulnerable to traffic analysis then the
stream cipher as these segments may also be identified by
listeners. Frequently changing the key can reduce this.
Block ciphers work well with packet switched networks.
Stream ciphers virtually ensure traffic analysis failure
by injecting messages into a continous cipher stream
produced by the encryption equipment.
Encryption techniques can be employed within a computer
system in several ways as reinforcement for security
provided by the operating system. System Controlled
Cryptographic transformations are made utilizing keys
embedded in tamper proof devices controlled by security
personnel. Transformations can be performed on every data
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segment transfer via DES or other techniques. User
Controlled Cryptographic transformations offer
individuals more control over their own data by allowing
them control of the key. [Ref. 40: p. 414]. This key
control could lead to significant problems in cases of loss
and may lead to the same vulnerability common to token or
password systems should the user write keys down and they
fall into the hands of others. SCC transformations make
more sense in SPLICE application.
Encryption can be performed at the Link level or End-to-
End (E 3 ). As noted in Chapter III, MILNET is using link
encryption between switches. Link encryption would also be
appropriate for transmission into and out of dial-up ports.
SPLICE should consider its vulnerabilities in connecting to
the nearest DDN switch without link encryption. E
encryption would ensure SPLICE transmission security across
the DDN without reliance only on DDN link security. This
had been the reason for IPLI devices. E enciphers data
once at the source and leaves it in that condition through
to the destination. At no time is sensitive data in plain
text even in the DDN switch. Only message addressing/
identifying information need to be left in clear text.
G. PORT PROTECTION
A variety of reasons exist for allowing some users a
dial-up capability for access to computer systems. In cases
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where use is infrequent the cost of dedicated lines may be
prohibitive. This is especially true where the infrequent
user is located at great distance. Mobile users such as
ships may not have the capability to connect to a single
dedicated line every time they are in port. For all these
reasons, the connectivity and convenience of dial-up local
telephone networks heavily weighs in favor of their use.
Disadvantages of dial-up include less performance and
poorer security. Users may be restricted to lower
performance modems. Line quality cannot be controlled.
Security suffers by a reduced capability for authenticating
users leading to potential connections with unauthorized
equipment
.
Administrative techniques to protect dial-up ports have
been developed as vulnerabilities come to light. It has
been proposed that system access be restricted to previously
arranged and justified applications [Ref. 41: p. 38].
Systems should restrict use only to periods when management
personnel are present [Ref. 42: p. 86]. During nonworking
hours ports should be physically disconnected from incoming
lines. [Ref. 43: p. 34]. Systems should restrict
dissemination of dial-port numbers to those with a need-to-
know and not use numbers which appear as significant gaps in
organizational telephone directories [Ref. 28: p. 27].
Finally management should restrict applications to those of
a non-sensitive nature.
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Other dial-up protection techniques deal with the
interface seen by remote users or their equipment. Dial-up
ports should not provide any indication of their computer
connections. Organizational logos and user prompts should
be avoided where possible. It has been recommended that the
line protocols utilized be at a higher level then ASCII
asynchronous, leaving personnel computers and dumb terminals
at a disadvantage [Ref. 28: p. 27]. The system should
automatically shut down any line left open without activity
for the last "N" minutes [Ref. 43: p. 34]. Error messages to
a user should not reveal information attackers might use to
their advantage [Ref. 42: p. 87]. Terminals should be
given some method for identifying themselves transparent to
the user (the IBM SDLC protocol for example allows
transmission of a "built-in" identifier, a two-byte device
type and a two-byte unique identifier) [Ref. 42: p. 87].
The activity can additionally employ encryption or dial-back
devices.
Dial-back devices are employed to accept incoming calls,
authenticate the user, close the connection, and dial-back
to a predetermined number for the user seeking access. The
advantage of such devices lies in limiting the potential
penetrator to the user site or at least to his published
phone number. Dial-back additionally eliminates all chances
for direct dial-in access on the request line. One other
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potential problem known as "drop-off add-on", occurring when
an authorized user leaves an open line and other parties
come into the system, is also eliminated [Ref. 41: p. 86].
Examples of dial-up port protection devices are in
Figure 7.2.
The principal disadvantage of dial-back devices lies in
the inconvenience in delay of session initiation. DOD
telephone systems are notoriously inadequate at many
installations and once a connection is broken it make take
several attempts to reintiate. Establishing a direct
dedicated number at the user end must be required if
shipboard connections with dial-back are to be accepted.
SPLICE plans for dial-up ports are restricted
to shipboard logistics in the SNAP i/ll program. These users
will be given connection capabilities via dial-up from their
serving port (i.e. NS Mayport) using 3270 emulation
protocols. [Ref. 19: p. 3-3]. The protection features
utilized in the past for such connections to UADPS-SP
applications have been limited to password protection
features in the operating system. It is recommended that
encryption or dial-back devices be installed. Ships have
been allowed to place orders through past connections
in addition to the originally authorized query capabilities.
It would seem that this capability needs protection.
74
TABLE 7.2 [ Re f . 36: p. 86]
DIALUP-PORT PROTECTION DEVICES
Vendor Product Lines Supported
Digital Pathways Defender II Up to 48 lines
Model 48
$10,000
Penril Datacom Auto-Data 1 line
300/1200S
$750





SPLICE is being implemented in a climate of both
changing user applications and changing technology. Both the
Fleet Material Support Office designed and local unique
applications should be carefully examined before SPLICE is
utilized for processing or data transfer to ensure that
their security requirements are being met. The changing
technology can be used to improve the security of a site or
break it down. The direction taken will depend on which
party places this technology in use first. As the world
becomes more computer literate the possibility of dishonest
personnel gaining the skills necessary for system compromise
grows. If SPLICE is to process and transmit sensitive data
it requires protection commensurate with its value.
As we have seen from the review of SAS, SPLICE has come
a long way toward improving data security and integrity. The
system has been developed and is in the implementation
process at several sites. The basic design meets
Solicitation Functional Requirements and it has been my
experience from field interviews that the vendor, FDC, is
supporting user requests for changes made thus far. The
custom nature of the SAS software and use of Tandem
developed high order language (TAL) in its constructs puts
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the responsibility for updates squarely on the vendor. The
result of that design choice is not clear; future support
remains to be seen. The real test of the system will come
when sites begin utilizing the DDN and other links for
intersite communications.
It is my opinion, after weighing both advantages and
disadvantages of various authentication techniques, that
passwords alone should not be relied on. The inclusion of
terminal authentication is of great benefit in further
limiting vulnerability, especially since program and
transaction access can be limited by terminal. A major area
of concern left unsecured is a combination passive/active
attack on the system possible due to both in-site and
between-site unprotected data streams. Both user password
and terminal identifier are still being passed in the clear.
Data transmissions between local and remote elements are
subject to the same vulnerability found in the
authentication area. Data could be analyzed/modified/de-
stroyed without detection. Although encryption suffers from
many administrative disadvantages and a slight performance
loss it appears warranted here.
Dial-up ports appear to be the only economical method of
access for SNAP shipboard systems available now. SPLICE is
risking disaster if ports are left unprotected by only the
password provisions. The major problem area here appears to
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be selection of an appropriate product and establishment of
proper administrative safeguards as noted in Chapter VI.
Finally, SPLICE safeguards cannot be analyzed for cost
effectiveness without proper Risk Assessments. This area
requires more attention and it appears to warrant more
central direction; each activity can potentially re-invent
the wheel without it.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The greatest problem encountered during research was
difficulty in locating measures of data value on which to
build safeguard selection criteria. The Risk Assessment
completed in 1980 was of little use here. It is highly
recommended that FMSO develop some set procedures and a
possible software tool on which individual site security
officers may base their Risk Assessments.
During my review of current literature regarding various
authentication techniques and specific products available I
found little in the way of comparative data. Ref 29, as far
back as 1980 advocated a study of the various security
products available for user authentication with rating
scales based on that number where adjustments made TYPE i/ll
errors equal possibilities. I recommend that the Computer
Security Center undertake such a study and then place
results in their Evaluated Products List data.
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I believe that SPLICE data for accounting/payroll/con-
tracts/etc. is of sufficient value to warrant transmission
protection by encryption. I also see the value in use of
dial-up ports for SNAP users and propose that these ports be
protected by dial-back devices as well. Only a system wide
review of SPLICE data security requirements will suffice in
the actual cost justification process for these features.
Plans to complete this assessment and acquire these devices
must be started now.
User authentication techniques other then passwords
still carry hefty pricetags and probably cannot be justified
now in SPLICE. I recommend that a close watch be




ADP Automatic Data Processing
ARPANET Advanced Research Projects Agency Network
AUTODIN II — Automatic Digital Network
COI Community of Interest
DAAS Defense Automatic Addressing System
DDN Defense Data Network
DES Data Encryption Standard
DLANET Defense Logistics Agency Network
DOD Department of Defense
E End-to-End Encryption
FDC Federal Data Corporation
ICPNET Inventory Control Point Network
IP Internet Protocol
IPLI Internet Private Line Interface
NAVSUP Naval Supply Systems Command
NBS National Bureau of Standards
PIN Personal Identification Number
SAP Security Access Profile
SAS Security Access System
SAUP Security Access Utility Program
SMON System Monitor System
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SPLICE Stock Point Logistics Integrated
Communications Environment
TAL Tandem Language
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
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